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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS - A NEED
FOR REFORM
JIM SMITH*
In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two cases
involving the scope of federal habeas corpus relief to state prisoners
under 28 U.S.C. sections 2244-2255.1 The Court divided five-to-four in
both cases and each contained sharp dissents.
In Townsend v. Sain, Justice Stewart in dissent observed that even
under the test enunciated by the majority, the Court should have af-
firmed the appellate court's denial of relief. He stated his main concern,
however, in the last paragraph of his opinion:
To require a federal court now to hold a new trial of factual claims which
were long ago fully and fairly determined in the courts of Illinois is, I
think, to frustrate the fair and prompt administration of criminal justice,
to disrespect the fundamental structure of our federal system, and to de-
base the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus ... .2
In Fay v. Noia, the Court upheld the power of a federal court to
grant habeas corpus relief notwithstanding the petitioner's decision not
to appeal his conviction out of fear that if he were successful he might
face retrial and a possible death sentence. Justice Brennan set forth the
requirement that, in order to forfeit his right to a consideration of his
federal claim, there had to be a "deliberate by-pass" of state court pro-
cedures by the applicant. This deliberate by-pass had to be "an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" by
the applicant after consultation with competent counsel. 3 Justice Clark
dissented because the decision dealt a "staggering blow" to the effective
administration of criminal justice and jeopardized the finality of state
convictions. He opined that "[a]fter today state judgments will be rele-
gated to ajudicial limbo, subject to federal collateral attack as here-a
score of years later despite a defendant's willful failure to appeal."' 4 Jus-
* Attorney General, State of Florida. J.D. Stetson University College of Law, 1967; B.A.
Florida State University, 1962.
1 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
2 372 U.S. at 334.
3 Id. at 439.
4 Id. at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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tice Harlan in his lengthy dissent suggested that the majority opinion
failed to understand the function of counsel and that the "effect [of the
decision] on state procedural rules may be disastrous ...."5
The history of federal habeas corpus since 1963 has demonstrated
that Townsend and Fay have not withstood the test of time and that the
Justices who dissented in those cases perceived correctly the abuses
which would result and the effect they would have upon the administra-
tion ofjustice. Indeed, the decision in Wainwn'ght v. Sykes6 vindicated the
position espoused by Justice Harlan in Fay and undercut the basic
premise of Townsend that state courts were not competent to dispose of
and protect the federal constitutional rights of persons tried in state
courts.
Although recent Supreme Court decisions have constricted the
scope of habeas corpus relief by strengthening the rule of Wainwnght v.
Sykes, 7 and have recognized the legitimate need for finality in the ad-
ministration of justice,8 congressional reform of the habeas corpus act is
essential to curb existing abuses. It was for this reason that, as Attorney
General of the State of Florida, I proposed certain amendments to 28
U.S.C. sections 636(b)(1)(B), 2244, and 2254(d), filed last year as S. 653
and H.R. 3416. 9
I. THE REVIEW BY FEDERAL MAGISTRATES OF STATE COURT
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Currently, 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B) authorizes United States
magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings on habeas corpus applica-
tions for post-trial relief by individuals convicted in state court of crimi-
nal offenses. The magistrate submits to the judge proposed findings of
fact and recommendations for disposition of the case, which the judge
may accept or reject.
The proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B) con-
tained in section 1 of H.R. 3416 would prohibit United States magis-
trates from conducting evidentiary hearings in state habeas corpus cases
without consent of the parties. The states have no interest in how much
authority Congress confers upon magistrates with respect to federal
5 Id. at 471 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
7 Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
8 United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982).
9 H.R. 3416, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H1791 (1980); S. 653, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REG. S1981 (1981). I explained the necessity for finality in the administra-
tion ofjustice in a memorandum to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. J. Smith,
Memorandum in support of S. 653 and H.R. 3416 Reforming Federal Habeas Corpus Proce-
dures Concerning Challenges to State Criminal Convictions (June 12, 1981)(submitted to
Senate and House Judiciary Committees).
1982] 1037
JIM SMITH
criminal proceedings. Some states are of the position, however, that
magistrates should not have the authority to make findings of fact that,
in practical effect, overrule decisions rendered by state trial judges and
even state supreme courts. A federal district judge should overrule state
decisions only if the judge's appointment comes under article III of the
United States Constitution.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld Congress' power to au-
thorize a magistrate to conduct evidentiary hearings, this does not mean
that Congress must grant such authority or that the present law should
not be overturned. If one views federal habeas corpus as an essential
requisite to insuring the protection of individual freedoms, then it would
seem that an experienced judicial officer should hear the disputed facts.
If Congress were to eliminate the magistrates' role in conducting eviden-
tiary hearings, leaving it up to federal judges alone to perform such a
fact finding function, Congress would avoid duplicative evidentiary
hearings and would prevent judges from merely "rubber stamping" the
magistrate's factual findings. Under my proposal, federal magistrates
would still handle all aspects of habeas corpus petitions except eviden-
tiary hearings, over which a magistrate would have jurisdiction only if
the parties consent to it.
II. THE FEDERAL LITIGATION OF ISSUES NOT PROPERLY RAISED IN
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
The proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. section 2244, contained in
section 2 of H.R. 3416, codifies the Supreme Court's decision in Wain-
wrzght v. Sykes 10 that the federal courts will not consider issues not prop-
erly raised at the state level unless a petitioner demonstrates "cause and
prejudice" for failure to comply with state court procedures. The re-
quirement that a petitioner must raise his claims in the state courts, ab-
sent special circumstances, is the only approach consistent with
traditional notions of federalism. It gives the state system an opportu-
nity to correct constitutional errors and to resolve factual disputes while
witnesses' memories are still keen. It also protects the defendants by
ensuring that their rights are promptly vindicated at the trial or on di-
rect appeal, rather than after many years of incarceration. Moreover,
the Wainwright requirement is essential to the fair administration ofjus-
tice because it prevents the defendant from "sandbagging" state courts
by deliberately refusing to raise claims in state court so that they can
later raise them for the first time in federal court. Finally, the proposed
legislation also specifically defines the Supreme Court requirement of
"'cause."
10 443 U.S. at 72.
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Two decisions demonstrate the need for the proposed amendment
to 28 U.S.C. section 2244. In Holzapfel v. Wainwright,11 for example, de-
fendant Holzapfel entered pleas of guilty in 1960 to the first degree
murders of a judge and his wife. Holzapfel told the court that he made
his plea freely, voluntarily, and with knowledge of the consequences
which would follow. He acknowledged that his earlier confession before
a county judge was an accurate statement of the events leading to the
deaths, and the court accordingly made the confession part of the
record.
Nine years later, Holzapfel petitioned a state court to vacate the
judgments and sentences he received. He claimed (1) that his plea was
involuntary, (2) that the government did not inform him of his right to
appeal, (3) that he made his confession before intelligently waiving his
right to counsel, and (4) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his
case because the victims drowned in the Atlantic Ocean. The state
court held an evidentiary hearing in 1970 and denied Holzapfel's mo-
tion. The appellate court subsequently affirmed the lower court's
decision. 12
In 1978, Holzapfel filed a second motion to vacate in the state trial
court, reiterating his prior assertions and also claiming his court ap-
pointed counsel was ineffective. The state court held an additional evi-
dentiary hearing on the newly raised claim in 1979 and again denied the
defendant's motion. The state appellate court affirmed.13 In 1981,
Holzapfel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. Holzapfel renewed the claims he had made earlier in state court,
and at present this case still awaits disposition by the magistrate.
Under the proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. section 2244(d), a
petitioner would have to raise these claims in the initial state court pro-
ceedings or, alternatively, he would have to establish that neither he nor
his attorney then had knowledge of the material and controlling facts
upon which he is basing his claim and that they could not ascertain such
facts by the exercise of due diligence.
Holzapfel, for example, had long been aware of the facts which
gave rise to his claims. He should have raised these issues in the original
state proceedings when the facts were readily ascertainable and when
the state court could correct any legitimate errors. Since delay
prejudices the state, Holzapfel should have to demonstrate why he could
not have raised the issues in the original proceeding. If he cannot
demonstrate such cause under the factors enumerated in this amend-
11 No. 81-8038-Civ-JCP (S.D. Fla. filed 1982).
12 Holzapfel v. State, 247 So. 2d 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
13 Holzapfel v. State, 392 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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ment, the federal court should bar his claim. 14
In Tler v. Phelps,t 5 a Louisiana state court tried and convicted
Gary Tyler of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. On di-
rect appeal, Tyler attempted to raise the impropriety of a jury instruc-
tion to which his attorney had failed to object at trial. The state
supreme court declined to entertain the argument because counsel had
failed to comply with the state's "contemporaneous objection rule"
which requires counsel to object at trial when the alleged error
occurred. 16
Tyler immediately filed a habeas petition in federal district court,
claiming that the jury instruction made the state judgment and sentence
constitutionally infirm. The federal district court denied relief because
of Tyler's failure to object to the charge at trial and his failure to estab-
lish "cause" as required by Wabzuwright v. Sykes. The federal court re-
jected Tyler's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as baseless.
On appeal, the fifth circuit noted that Wainwrzght v. Sykes had held
that a petitioner must establish cause and prejudice but reversed the
district court's order denying the writ of habeas corpus. The court de-
cided that the Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur 17 made the
instruction in Tler improper.' 8  After finding that this charge
prejudiced Tyler, the court decided that the ignorance of counsel was
sufficient to satisfy the Sykes requirement of "cause."' 19
The court thus concluded in Tyler that oversight or ignorance of
counsel satisfies the cause requirement and that failure to comply with
the state's legitimate procedural rules did not preclude federal habeas
corpus relief. The court did note that Sykes would still require denial of
the writ if the state couldprove that the defendant's counsel attempted to
"sandbag" the trial judge or to build error into the record.
One thing the court failed to acknowledge, however, is that it is
unlikely that any defense lawyer will ever admit that he deliberately
attempted to take such actions. The state, therefore, will have great
difficulty proving the subjective intent of defense counsel. As Justice
14 This case also illustrates the need for the statute of limitations on habeas corpus actions.
Two key witnesses, attorneys Hal Ives and Harry Hausen, died prior to the 1979 evidentiary
hearing. Both attorneys could have testified as to the voluntariness of Holzapfel's confessions
and guilty pleas. Holzapfel's assertion that now deceased law enforcement officials made
promises to him is also difficult, if not impossible, to refute. Thus Holzapfel may be able to
prevail not because his cause is meritorious, but because the state is unable at this late date to
contradict his testimony. If Holzapfel is granted a new trial, it would be difficult to prove
anew his guilt 26 years after the murders and 20 years after the entry of his plea.
15 622 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1980).
16 State v. Tyler, 342 So. 2d 574, 590 (La. 1977).
17 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
18 622 F.2d at 172.
19 See Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
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Burger observed in Estelle v. Williams, "[i]t is not necessary, if indeed it
were possible, for us to decide whether this [failure to object] was a de-
fense tactic or simply indifference .... -20 Under the test established
by the panel in Tyler, the rule of Wainwright v. Sykes cannot protect the
orderly procedure of state courts.21
The rule barring federal consideration of claims because of proce-
dural defaults was supported by the recent Supreme Court decisions in
United States v. Frady22 and Engle v. Isaac.23 In Engle, Justice O'Connor
noted that "counsel might have overlooked or chosen to-omit .. .[a]
due process argument while pursuing other avenues of defense ....
She also remarked that the constitutional guarantee of competent coun-
sel "does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every
conceivable constitutional claim ....
Congress should establish an objective definition of what consti-
tutes "cause" so as to end the continued confusion. Such a definition
would prevent the lower federal courts from warping the Sykes-Engle
doctrine in order to reach the merits of a case years after the trial when
the "[p]assage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses
... render retrial difficult, even impossible." 26
20 425 U.S. 501, 512 n.9 (1978)(emphasis added).
21 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The fifth circuit, in Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551
F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1977), and the second circuit, in Indiviglio v. United States, 612 F.2d 624
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 933 (1980), both perceived the analytical deficiencies of
the Tyler decision. In Zndiviglio, the second circuit followed Lumpkin .Ricketts by stating that
"a mere allegation of error by counsel is insufficient to establish 'cause' to excuse a procedural
default." 612 F.2d at 631. The court decided that "the interests of finality in judgments
required such a holding."
Significantly, on rehearing the Tyler case, the fifth circuit receded from its original posi-
tion and held that Sykes barred consideration of Tyler's claim. 643 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1980).
In a subsequent case, the fifth circuit recognized that its later Tyler decision was the correct
treatment of the habeas corpus issue and it cited with approval the Indiiglio decision. Wash-
ington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276 (1981).
22 102 S. Ct. 1584.
23 102 S. Ct. 1558.
24 Id. at 1574.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1571. See also Hanna . Wainwright, No. 77-8401-Civ-CF (S.D. Fla. July 31, 1978)
where the federal district court held a hearing on Hanna's fourth habeas petition, which
raised an issue that Hanna had earlier decided not to appeal. The court should not have
considered Hanna's habeas petition on its merits because of his deliberate bypass of state
remedies. An inmate should have an obligation to pursue his state appeal so that any error in
the state trial court can be remedied promptly. The district court ultimately denied Hanna's
petition on the merits. Id.
In Marlin v. Wainwrzght, 533 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1976), the fifth circuit affirmed the district
court's denial on the merits of Martin's habeas petition, which raised an issue which Martin
had not appealed in state court. Under the amendment proposed in section 2 of H.R. 3416,
the district court would not have reached the merits of this petition because of Martin's fail-
ure to present the issue in a state appeal.
JIM SMITH
III. A THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR HABEAS
CORPUS PETITIONS
The proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. section 2244 contained in
section 2 of H.R. 3416 provides for a statute of limitations in habeas
corpus cases. Such a provision is essential to ensuring finality of crimi-
nal judgments, since prisoners frequently wait many years to bring a
habeas corpus action seeking to set aside a judgment and sentence. If
the habeas petition raises an issue which the prisoner had not raised at
the state level, and the record does not resolve it, the state is often inca-
pable of refuting the prisoner's testimony and, as a consequence, the
petitioner prevails. Such a system has hardly contributed to public con-
fidence in the judicial system. The rules of habeas corpus cases do per-
mit the dismissal of a petition on the equitable basis of laches. Yet,
courts dismiss few cases on this ground. In any event, a trial on the issue
of laches is as burdensome as a trial on the merits and accordingly af-
fords no real relief from stale claims. The proposed three year statute of
limitations would begin to run after the state court conviction and any
direct appeal has become final.
Walker v. Wainwrz'&h27 illustrates the need for a statute of limita-
tions in habeas corpus cases. In Walker, the defendant raped a female
child in 1937. Since a number of citizens had witnessed the rape,
Walker entered a guilty plea and received a life sentence. In 1968, after
revocation of his parole and his reincarceration, Walker filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in federal court alleging that the state had not
provided him with an attorney in the original trial and that the arrest-
ing officer had coerced him into pleading guilty. The federal court or-
dered an evidentiary hearing even though the records showed that
Walker did have an attorney at the time he entered the plea and thirty
years had passed since the entry of the plea.
Fortunately, the state located the sheriff who had arrested Walker.
The sheriff was the only living witness to the events besides Walker,
since both the defense lawyer and trial judge had died years earlier. At
the hearing, the sheriff denied threatening Walker and testified that the
charge was absurd because the state had numerous witnesses who
caught Walker raping the child. The district judge denied the writ of
habeas corpus, finding that Walker was not credible28 and the fifth cir-
cuit affirmed the order.2 9
One year later, Walker filed a second petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in which he alleged that his attorney in the original trial was
27 Walker v. Wainwright, 430 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971).
28 Walker v. Wainwright, 350 F. Supp. 916 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
29 430 F.2d at 936.
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ineffective. The state raised laches as an affirmative defense to an issu-
ance of the writ, because trial counsel had died and, without his testi-
mony, the state could not refute the defendant's testimony. The federal
district judge held a second evidentiary hearing and, on the basis of
Walker's uncontradicted testimony, granted the writ of habeas corpus.
The court presumed that counsel had prejudiced Walker by pleading
Walker guilty shortly after he agreed to represent him.
Due to the death of key witnesses, the state could not establish sev-
eral possible explanations for Walker's guilty plea. The state could not
prove that the trial judge had opposed the death penalty or that counsel
had entered a guilty plea to avoid the possibility of a death sentence
being returned by the jury.30
While the law allows dismissal of habeas corpus petitions on
grounds of laches or inexcusable delay,-1 the federal courts have been
30 Several other cases illustrate the need for the statute of limitations section of H.R. 3416.
In Griffith v. Wainwright, No. 79-6387-Civ-JLK (S.D. Fla. 1977), Griffith was convicted of
second-degree murder. Ten years after his conviction was affirmed in the state courts, Grif-
fith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Griffith's petition
raised seven grounds for relief, most of which were evidentiary in nature. The federal district
court denied all seven claims Griffith raised in his petition. Griffith's appeal is now pending in
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, no. 80-5989.
When Griffith's case was before the state courts, he was aware of all the issues he subse-
quently raised in the habeas corpus petition. The proposed statute of limitations would bar
such litigation of issues which could have been raised before state courts.
In Maxwell v. Wainwright, No. 77-371-Orl-Civ-Y (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 1977) Maxwell was
convicted in 1964 of second-degree murder and assault with intent to commit murder. In
1971, Maxwell filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court claiming ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. It was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. In 1973,
Maxwell was paroled, but in 1977 his parole was revoked. He then filed another habeas
corpus petition again complaining of ineffective assistance of counsel at his 1964 trial. The
court again dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust state remedies.
It is now seventeen years since Maxwell's conviction and he has never challenged the
effectiveness of his trial counsel in state courts. The federal court, rather than dismissing his
case without prejudice and thereby allowing Maxwell to refile his claims again, could have
barred Maxwell's 1971 and 1977 petitions under the proposed statute of limitations. Because
of the passage of time, there is little likelihood the state could now successfully retry Maxwell
if he were to secure a reversal of his judgment.
In Scarborough v. State, No. 80-1082-Civ-T-M (M.D. Fla. filed 1979), the defendant
pled guilty on November 16, 1970 to two counts of rape. In 1979, he filed for habeas corpus
relief in federal district court. The court dismissed the petition so that Scarborough could
pursue another remedy in state court. In early 1980, Scarborough then filed a motion in state
court alleging his incompetence due to "mental fatigue." After Scarborough appealed form
the denial of this motion, he again filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
As a ground for relief, Scarborough alleged his incompetence at the time of his pleading.
In the interim between his inital pleading in 1970 and Scarborough's latest petition, the
assistant state attorney who had handled his case passed away. Without the principal witness
to Scarborough's demeanor at the time of his pleading, the state is prejudiced by the nine
year delay. The proposed statute of limitations would bar this stale claim.
31 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
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quite reluctant to dismiss petitions for these reasons. 32 For example,
Paprskar v. Estelle3 3 reversed a district court's dismissal of a habeas peti-
tion on these grounds. Judge Coleman concurred specially in the rever-
sal with the following observation:
Of course, the Constitution is supreme and must be obeyed. I do not
quarrel with that. I do find it to be painfully incongruous that he who
defies all civilized notions of due process in the summary theft of human
life is allowed, years after the event and years after his conviction has
become final, to raise all kinds of constitutional claims which, if they ex-
isted, could have been raised at trial or, at least, soon thereafter.
The fault, of course, is not with the Great Writ. It lies in the manner
in which it is allowed belatedly to be invoked. While Congress has com-
mendably made some effort to limit jurisdiction for the entertainment of
these eleventh hour attacks on state court convictions it is readily apparent to
one regularl'y dealing with the subject that those eforts have not met with much
success.
Very few belated applications of habeas corpus claim that the peti-
tioner is innocent. The fundamental purpose of the Writ has been dis-
torted. The confidence of the general public in the ability of state courts to bring
crim'nals to justice has been eroded The deterrent ejecl of law prohibiting criminal
conduct has been seriousy damaged The decisions say that the Writ may not be used
as a second appeal, butfrom experience the outlaws know better. Instead of being a
bulwark of freedom for the citizen it has been allowed to become a last,
and too often a sure, refuge for those who have respected neither the law
nor the Constitution.
I would not limit the Writ, if I could, but I most assuredly would limit
its application in situations such as we encounter in this case.
As I do here, I must follow the law as it exists. I do not understand,
however, that I am not allowed to mention serious defects in the law. 34
Judge Coleman eloquently states the need for some type of statute
of limitations to extinguish stale claims of prisoners that sometimes suc-
ceed, not because they are meritorious, but because the passage of time
prevents the state from refuting the claims.
IV. STATE EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
Section 3 of H.R. 3416 modifies 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) to pre-
vent federal courts from holding an evidentiary hearing on a factual
dispute when a state court had already conducted an evidentiary hear-
ing which fully and fairly resolved the merits of the issue. The Supreme
Court and Congress agree that when a state court makes a finding of
fact after a full and fair hearing, the Constitution does not guarantee
32 See e.g., Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Estelle, 570 F.2d
546 (5th Cir. 1978); Hamilton v. Watkins, 436 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1970).
33 612 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980).
34 Id. at 1008 (emphasis added).
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another hearing in federal court. 35
In Townsend, Chief Justice Warren decided that a federal district
judge had the discretion to hold a new hearing even when the judge
concludes that "the habeas applicant was afforded a full and fair hear-
ing by the state court .... -36 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring
opinion in Brown v. Allen, 37 recognized that there must be some guide-
lines governing the necessity of hearings in district courts because, with-
out such rules, district judges would be "free to misuse the writ by either
being too lax or too rigid in its employment."3 The proposed amend-
ment embodied in section 3 of H.R. 3416 provides not only that a fed-
eral court need not hold a duplicative hearing but that it shall not hold
such a hearing if the appropriate factual determination was previously
made. The amendment repeals subsections (6) and (7) of 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2254(d) to eliminate a redundancy, since subsections (1), (2), and
(3) of section 2254 (d) already incorporate the same concept. The
amendment rewrites subsection (6) to codify the Jackson v. Virginia"9
standard of review of state factual findings.
Unfortunately, many federal courts apparently regard existing leg-
islation as permissive and insist upon holding evidentiary hearings re-
gardless of the care of the state courts. There is no rational reason for a
second hearing to determine issues of fact if the state court procedures
adequately develop the facts and resolve the issues. As Justice Frank-
furter noted in Brown, where the state court records affirmatively show
no violation of an accused's rights, "[i]t certainly would make only for
burdensome and useless repetition of effort if the federal courts were to
rehear the facts in such cases."' 40 Additionally, Justice Stevens in his
concurring opinion tojackson voiced his complaint against the unpro-
ductive labor expended in an attempt to redetermine facts-a process
which amounts to nothing more than second guessing the first
factfinder.41 Of course, if the state court hearing was not a full and fair
hearing, the federal district courts should intervene and determine the
factual issues anew. Justice requires nothing more.42
35 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 312-13.
36 Id. at 318.
37 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 513.
39 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Jackson declares that an applicant is entitled to habeas corpus
relief "if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324.
40 344 U.S. at 504.
41 443 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42 See e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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Jurek v. Eslel/e,43 illustrates the need for a limit on federal court dis-
cretion to hold evidentiary hearings in habeas cases. Jurek was indicted
for the 1973 murder of a ten year old child. At his state court trial,
Jurek filed a motion to suppress confessions that he had given to the
authorities shortly after his arrest. Although the Texas trial court con-
ducted a suppression hearing, Jurek elected not to testify. The Texas
trial judge found that Jurek had given the confessions voluntarily. The
judge also allowed the jury to determine the voluntariness, weight, and
credibility of the confessions. The jury found Jurek guilty and sen-
tenced him to death, whereupon Jurek instituted an appeal to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals. Jurek raised several issues including the ad-
missibility of his written confessions. The court found that the record
supported the trial judge's finding that the confessions were voluntary,
and affirmed the judgment and sentence. 44 The Supreme Court of the
United States also affirmed the decision after upholding Texas' death
penalty statute.45
Jurek then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court, in which he again claimed that his confessions were invol-
untary and thus inadmissible. The federal district judge, after reviewing
the state court records and other evidence presented by the parties,
ruled against Jurek, who then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In 1979, in a two-to-one decision, the
court held that "under all the circumstaces, Jurek's confessions were in-
voluntary. '46 The panel never addressed the ramifications of section
2254(d) nor was there any evidence that the state trial court did not
conduct a full and fair hearing. It ordered a new trial and held that the
state could not use the confessions given by Jurek in a subsequent trial.4 7
Judge Coleman remarked in a vigorous dissent:
We have never seen Jurek; we have not seen or heard any of the wit-
nesses. The majority disagrees with the findings of all the judges and ju-
rors who have done so and it follows its own notions of what the evidence
should have established. In my opinion, such 'independent findings' are
unjustified.4 8
The State of Texas filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the
court granted on June 5, 1979. On August 11, 1980, seven years after
the crime, a sharply divided Court of Appeals rendered a forty-five page
decision also reversing the district court's denial of the writ of habeas
43 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), rehg granted, Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, Estelle v. Jurek, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
44 Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1975).
45 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
46 593 F.2d at 676.
47 Id. at 679.
48 Id. at 686 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
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corpus. 4 9 A majority of the court found the first confession voluntary
but the second confession involuntary.
This case illustrates the absolute need for a modification of section
2254(d). If federal courts are free to make an "independent determina-
tion" of questions of fact without regard to the findings made by the
judges and juries who heard and saw the witnesses and notwithstanding
the fact that the record supports those findings, then one must wonder
why the state courts should go through the trouble of holding hearings
and whether the state can ever deem any judgment as final.50
Beach v. Backbum 5' also illustrates the need for section 3 of H.R.
3416, particularly as it changes the wording of subsection (2) from "ma-
terial facts were not adequately developed" to "could not be adequately
developed." Beach was under indictment for first-degree murder and
armed robbery. At his trial, Beach moved to suppress a statement he
had given to the authorities in Louisiana, after his arrest in North Caro-
lina and return to Louisiana. A hearing showed that he received his
Miranda warnings and waived his rights to counsel and to remain silent.
He then made a written admission. Beach, who did not testify at the
suppression hearing, was convicted and he appealed to the Louisiana
Supreme Court. On appeal, he claimed that the statement was inadmis-
sible because he was misinformed as to when the court would appoint
counsel for him. The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and con-
cluded that the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress "fully
support[s] the ruling that defendant understood his Fifth Amendment
rights and voluntarily waived the same when he gave the oral and writ-
ten statements.
'52
After he lost his appeal in the state court, Beach filed for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court. The petition claimed that his
confession was involuntary because his treatment in North Carolina ren-
dered him incompetent to waive his rights on arrival in Louisiana. The
federal district court denied the petition without conducting an eviden-
tiary hearing because there was no support in the record for Beach's
claim of mistreatment in North Carolina. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
federal district court and ordered an evidentiary hearing because the
state courts did not determine the effect of the alleged mistreatment of
Beach upon the voluntariness of his statement. 53
49 623 F.2d at 929.
50 See Montes v. Jenkins, 581 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1978), where the court effectively refused
to give a state court's findings of fact the weight intended by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and shifted the
burden of showing sufficiency to the state. Se also McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th
Cir. 1974).
5t 631 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1980).
52 State v. Beach, 320 So.2d 143, 145 (La. 1975).
53 631 F.2d at 1168.
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This case demonstrates what occurs in most habeas corpus cases
filed by state prisoners. They originally attack the admissibility of a
statement and receive a hearing. The state court makes a finding upon
the facts presented at that time and, as here, the defendant frequently
does not testify. Years later-for Beach it was six years-the petitioner
alleges the statement was inadmissible and presents a new version of the
facts, even though he knew or could have known of these facts at the
time of the initial hearing. Since the petitioner did not present his ver-
sion of the facts at the original hearing, the state court finding, which is
otherwise correct, will not support a summary dismissal under section
2254(d) as it is now written. In short, the state court prisoner can always
allege "new" facts and thus force the court to hold a hearing, thereby
burdening the court and the state-especially when there are few, if
any, witnesses remaining who remember the facts and who can refute
the defendant's allegations.
This is a weakness in existing law which Congress and the courts
must address. Justice and finality demand that when the state court
first affords a defendant an opportunity to present all known facts rele-
vant to the disposition of an issue, he or she must present them at that
time. Thus, the habeas corpus statute should provide that a federal
court's review of a habeas corpus petition should defer to the state court
findings if the defendant could have developed the material facts at the
trial, even if he or she actually did not develop those facts at trial. As
the Supreme Court commented in Wainwright v. Sykes, which involved
an attack an a confession not challenged in the state courts:
A defendant has been accused of a serious crime, and this [the state
trial] is the time and place set for him to be tried by a jury of his peers and
found either guilty or not guilty by that jury. To the greatest extent possible all
issues which bear on this charge should be determined in this proceeding: the ac-
cused is in the courtroom, the jury is in the box, the judge is on the bench,
and the witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly sworn, await their
turn to testify. Society's resources have been concentrated at that time and
place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question
of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens. Any procedural rule which en-
courages the result that those proceedings be as free of error as possible is
thoroughly desirable, and the contemporaneous-objection rule surely falls
within this classification.
We believe the adoption of the Francis rule in this situation will have
the salutary effect of making the state trial on the merits the "main event,"
so to speak, rather than a "try out on the road" for what will later be the
determinative federal habeas hearing. There i nothing in the Constitution or in
the language of §2254 which requires that the state trial on the issue of guilt or
innocence be devoted largely to the testimony offact witnesses directed to the elements of
the state crime, while only later will there occur in a federal habeas hearing a full
airing of the federal constitutional claims which were not raised in the state proceed-
ings. If a criminal defendant thinks that an action of the state trial court is
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about to deprive him of a federal constitutional right there is every reason
for his following state procedure in making known his objection.5 4
Section 2254(d) will be meaningless and never ensure the finality of
criminal convictions so long as a defendant can avoid it by simply not
presenting factual testimony that is available and which he could have
presented.
Even Chief Justice Warren, in Townsend v. Sain, recognized that if
the habeas petitioner could have developed facts but did not, the peti-
tioner has no right to another plenary hearing. He said: "Where newly
discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas application, evidence which could
not reasonably have been presented to the state trier offacts, the federal court
must grant an evidentiary hearing. . . . If, for any reason not attributable
to the inexcusable neglect ofpetitioner, evidence crucial to the adequate con-
sideration of the constitutional claim was not developed at the state
hearing, a federal hearing is compelled. '55
When Congress enacted section 2254(d) to codify Townsend, it cre-
ated problems by leaving out of the language of section 2254(d) the
qualification of Townsend, to wit: whether the facts "could have been
developed" rather than whether the "facts were not adequately devel-
oped at the state court hearing. 5 6 The proposed amendment to section
2254(d) corrects this deficiency and prevents the injustices discussed
above.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Jackson perceived the abuses that would flourish if the
courts did not confine the scope of the writ of habeas corpus and noted
in his concurrence to Brown v. Allen: "The writ has no enemies so deadly
as those who sanction the abuse of it, whatever their intent. '5 7 In the
same case, Justice Frankfurter cautioned that the writ had the potential
for evil as well as for good and that abuse of the writ could undermine
the orderly administration of justice.58 In the last twenty years, both the
expansion of the writ and the manner in which the inferior federal
courts have utilized it to review de novo state court judgments have
demonstrated the truth of those predictions.
The problem with federal habeas corpus today is not so much that
federal courts want to continue "reviewing" state court judgments, but
that they feel obliged to do so because of the language of section 2254,
which has remained unchanged over the years. The United States
54 433 U.S. at 90 (emphasis added).
55 372 U.S. at 317 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
56 Id.
57 344 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 512 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court, prone to adhering to stare decizsi, is reluctant to redefine
the scope of the writ. Congress is the appropriate body to define the lim-
its of federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments. This legis-
lative body must address the abuses and assist the Court by clarifying its
intent. The Court is aware of the abuses and has attempted, within the
limits of its proper function, to eliminate them. If the Congress does not
recognize its responsibility, then Congress, not the Court, must take the
blame for the lack of finality of judgments and the continuance of cur-
rent abuses.
